

Introducing Brexit to NiGEM

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Plan

1. Background

- a) Economics and politics of Brexit**
- b) A brief introduction to NiGEM**

2. Modelling Brexit in NiGEM

3. Results



BACKGROUND

- a) Economics and politics of Brexit
- b) A brief introduction to NiGEM




Economics: types of trading relationships


- **WTO rules:** no special trading relationship ('Hard' or 'Orderly' Brexit) with EU and 50+ countries. Free to negotiate FTA with 3rd countries. Particularly restrictive for services trade.
- **Free trade agreement:** enable reciprocal market opening by granting preferential access to markets. Free to negotiate FTA with 3rd countries. Primarily for goods, much less for services trade. EU has FTAs with more than 50 countries ('Deal + FTA').
- **Customs Union:** Common external tariffs and barriers. Countries in a CU negotiate FTAs with 3rd countries as a block. EU rules apply in all participating countries ('Deal + Backstop')
- **EU Single Market:** free movement of goods, services, capital and people. Applies to EU member states as EEA countries. This 4 rights are indivisible for the EU.
- **European Economic Area:** EU Member States + Norway, Liechtenstein + Iceland (Single Market but not in the CU, therefore trade frictions arising from Rules of Origin)
- **European Free Trade Area:** EEA + Switzerland



The economic trade-off



Politics: what is the backstop?



- Map shows the referendum outturn. Broadly speaking, England & Wales voted to exit while Scotland & N. Ireland voted to remain.
- Both parties committed to the *Good Friday* or *Belfast Agreement*
- If no trade deal is achieved by 2020 that avoids a hard border in the island of Ireland & the transition period is not extended, then the backstop will be triggered. Under the backstop, "a single customs territory between the (European) Union and the United Kingdom" will be created.
- The UK will in effect remain in a customs union with the EU and therefore, unable to negotiate trade agreements with 3rd countries.



1. BACKGROUND

- a) Economics and politics of Brexit
- b) A brief introduction to NiGEM

NiGEM Overview

- NiGEM is a large model of the world economy and is used for **forecasting** and **scenario** analysis
- Discrete models for most **OECD** economies and other countries such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa etc. There are regional blocks for the remaining countries in Asia, America, Africa, the Middle East and Europe
- Models depend on both **theory and data**
- There is a common (estimated and calibrated) **underlying structure** across all economies
- **Long-run structure relatively rigid**
- Contains both **forward looking, rational expectations and adaptive learning**.
- **Flexible policy** environments




Structure of NiGEM

- The country models have complete demand and supply sides, also full asset structures
- Most behavioural equations estimated in error-correction format
- Rational expectations options
 - Financial markets
 - Labour markets
 - Consumption
- Country Linkages
 - trade and competitiveness
 - interacting financial markets
 - through international stocks of assets
- Supply-side
 - based on CES relationship between capital (K) and labour (L), embedded in a Cobb-Douglas framework with oil (M)
- Government
 - direct and indirect taxes, government spending and interest payments.
 - tax rule to ensure long run solvency



The Structure



Modelling GDP

- In the short- to medium-term, GDP is driven by the demand side

$$Y = C + I + G + XVOL - MVOL$$

- In the longer term, GDP is driven by the supply side

$$YCAP = \gamma [\delta K^{-\rho} + (1 - \delta)(Le^{\lambda_{techl}})^{-\rho}]^{-(1-\alpha)/\rho} M^{\alpha}$$




2. MODELLING BREXIT IN NIGEM

Ebell Monique, Hurst Ian, Warren James: Modelling the long-run economic impact of leaving the European Union. *Economic Modelling* 59(2016) 196-209



The Engagement Triangle




- As a member of the Single Market, the UK enjoys complete market access, allows free labour movement and pays around 0.5% of GNI to the EU.
- Trade access will be heavily restricted under the Backstop and FTA scenarios. Greater restrictions will apply under a simple FTA.
- We assume that labour movement will be heavily restricted and the fiscal contribution will be much smaller under the Backstop and FTA scenarios



Assumptions



Modelling the Brexit deal



1. Reduction in trade (non-tariff barriers)

- Export and Import volume equations are in error correction form and trade volumes are driven by price and demand

Export volume equation in NiGEM

$$\Delta \log(xvol_t) = \beta_1 \Delta \log\left(\frac{pxncom}{cpx}_t\right) + \beta_2 \Delta \log(S_t) - \lambda_1 \left(\log\left(\frac{xvol_{t-1}}{S_{t-1}}\right) + \alpha_1 \log\left(\frac{pxncom}{cpx}_{t-1}\right) \right)$$




1. Reduction in trade (non-tariff barriers)

- The loss of access to the EU is modelled through the export market size variable (S_t) and phased in over a two-year period

$$S_t = \sum_0^{eu} \phi_{eu} \epsilon_{eu} mvol_{t,eu} + \sum_0^{rw} \phi_{rw} mvol_{t,rw}$$

- For the No deal Brexit scenario we have assumed a 56% reduction in trade from the EU and a 38% reduction under the Customs Union scenario.



2. Labour productivity

- The loss of access to the EU is modelled through the export market size variable (S_t) and phased in over a two-year period

$$YCAP = \gamma \left[\delta K^{-\rho} + (1 - \delta) \{ L e^{\lambda_{techl}} \}^{-\rho} \right]^{\frac{-(1-\alpha)}{\rho}} O^{\alpha}$$


- Lower labour productivity (techl) by 1.6% by 2030 under the no-deal scenario and by 1% for the Customs Union scenario



RESULTS



Main results

Summary table: Long-run economic impact of different Brexit scenarios
Difference relative to Stay scenario in 2030

	GDP % difference	GDP £2016 prices	GDP per head % difference	GDP per head £ 2016 prices
Deal + FTA (Proposed deal)	-3.9%	-£100 bn	-3.0%	-£1,090
Deal + Backstop	-2.8%	-£70 bn	-1.9%	-£700
Orderly no deal	-5.5%	-£140 bn	-3.7%	-£1,330


Source: NIESR. The Stay scenario is an estimate of how the economy would develop if the UK were to stay in the EU.

- Under the proposed deal, the economy will be around 4% smaller in 2030 relative to a scenario where the UK stays in the EU. This implies a per capita GDP loss of 3% or around £1,090.
- The losses are smaller if the backstop is activated.
- Under our orderly no-deal scenario, the GDP loss is 5.5% over the same period.



The level of GDP

GDP per capita, per cent difference relative to remain




- The path to the long term is uncertain, but the impact of the shock is likely to be front-loaded



What explains the lower level of GDP?

Contributions to GDP impact – Deal + FTA scenario




- The 3 channels that explain the bulk of the loss in output are: productivity, migration and trade



GDP per capita

GDP per capita, levels 2016 prices



- GDP per capita will expand under all scenarios in the long term, but people will be permanently less well-off compared with the counterfactual Stay scenario.



THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED BREXIT DEAL

Arno Hantzsche, Amit Kara and
Garry Young

26 November 2018



ADDITIONAL SLIDES



How do we compare?

Comparison of Brexit deal impact studies


		Close relationship	FTA	Orderly no-deal
<i>Long run</i>				
NIESR	% GDP	-2.8%	-3.9%	-5.5%
	% GDP per capita	-1.9%	-3.0%	-3.7%
UK in a Changing Europe	% GDP	n/a	n/a	n/a
	% GDP per capita	-5.5%		-8.7%
HM Government	% GDP	-2.1% to -3.9%	-4.9% to -6.7%	-7.7% to -9.3%
	% GDP per capita	-2.1% to -2.7%	-4.9% to -5.4%	-7.6% to -8.1%
<i>Medium run (2023)</i>				
NIESR	% GDP	-2.6%	-2.0%	-3.2%
Bank of England	% GDP	-1.25% to -3.75%		-7.75%

Notes: 'Close relationship' encompasses comparable scenarios with stronger regulatory convergence compared to a free trade agreement but characterised by non-tariff barriers in particular to services trade. This includes NIESR's 'Deal + Backstop' scenario and the scenario by HM Government called 'White Paper w/ 50% NTB sensitivity'.

Source: NIESR.



Brexit and the exchange rate



Trade assumptions: exposure to the EU


UK export and imports, EU and rest of the world, 2017



- UK has a large trade exposure to the EU/EFTA for both goods and services
- UK has a trade deficit in goods with the EU/EFTA. This is partially offset by a surplus in services



Services sector: under GATS and CETA




- The services sector is particularly vulnerable because access under GATS is less comprehensive than the Single Market. The EU-Canada FTA is ambitious but...
- ... the financial sector, communications and transport are vulnerable under CETA as well



Service sector: major exports

UK services trade volumes by industry, 2017




The financial sector, telecommunications and transport are important for the UK



The external sector

Impact on UK trade, per cent difference to remain




Both export and import volumes will fall in spite of the currency depreciation



Labour market

Impact on Unemployment rate, per cent difference to remain




- The unemployment rate will be higher in the short run. Wages adjust in the long term.



Investment, wages and consumption

Impact on investment and income, per cent difference to remain




- Investment will fall by £19-21 bn each year. This leads to lower wages and also lower consumer spending.



Supply side

Supply side effects, per cent difference to remain




The long run is driven by the supply side. Potential output has been eroded by lower investment/capital stock



Public finance: fiscal debt

Impact on public finances, percentage points difference to remain



The fiscal debt will be higher even after considering the lower level of EU contributions



Sensitivity of our estimates

GDP per cent difference relative to remain, long-run impact in 2030

	Main result	Alternative trade and productivity assumptions	Main case with trade deals with non-EU countries
Deal + FTA	-3.9%	-3.1%	-3.7%
Deal + Backstop	-2.8%	-2.1%	n/a
No deal	-5.5%	n/a	-5.2%

Source: NIESR.

- The results do not change materially to alternative assumptions
- GDP impact is somewhat smaller if we halve the shock to productivity and trade
- GDP will be just 0.2pp higher if the UK strikes trade deals with the BRIICS and the Anglosphere



Financial transactions with the EU

Transactions with the European Union on a 'no Brexit' counterfactual (£, billion)

	2017–18 (outturn)	2018–19	2019–20	2020–21	2021–22	2022–23	2023–24
GNI based contribution	11.8	13.9	15.6	15.4	15.5	15.3	15.4
VAT payments to the EU	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.5
UK abatement	–4.5	–4.6	–4.6	–4.4	–4.5	–4.5	–4.5
Receipts from the EU to cover the costs of collecting Traditional Own Resources	–0.7	–0.7	–0.7	–0.7	–0.7	–0.7	–0.7
Total expenditure transfers included in AME, TME and PSNB	9.5	11.7	13.5	13.5	13.6	13.5	13.6
Traditional Own Resources	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5
Public sector receipts from the EU	–4.5	–5.0	–5.3	–6.1	–6.0	–6.1	–6.2
Net contribution to the EU budget	8.4	10.0	11.6	10.8	11.0	10.8	10.9

Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, Supplementary Fiscal Tables October 2018, Table 2.25.



The structure of a model equation

- Long run - what factors drive economic variables

$$y_t = a + b * x_t + e_t$$

- Adjustment - how long does it take to reach equilibrium

$$\Delta y_t = \lambda [y_{t-1} - a - b * x_{t-1}] + \textit{dynamics} + \textit{error}$$

